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It is right and just to disclose to vendees those hidden defects which materially lessen the value of the realty they are
purchasing or renting. The WisconSin court is apparently
aware of the outmoded aid no longer useful application of the
maxim caveat emptor and has begun the process of eliminating it. It is hoped that the court will recognize the inequity of
imposing the duty of disclosure on a certain class of vendors
while retaining the rule of caveat emptor for others and will
make the duty of disclosure espoused in Ollerman applicable
to all vendors. Until then, caveat emptor in Wisconsin realty
transactions is dying but not dead.
FREDERICK C. WAMHOFF

PROPERTY-Landlord-Tenant-Landlord No
Longer Immune from Tort Liability for Failure to
Exercise Reasonable Care in Maintaining Premises.
Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America, 91 Wis.
2d 734, 284 N.W.2d 55 (1979). At common law, the lease
of land was treated as equivalent to a sale of land for the term
of the lease. The lessee acquired an estate in land and was, for
the time he occupied the land, subject to virtually all the liabilities of the owner of a fee simple.' For this reason, the doctrine of caveat emptor applied to a lessee as well as to a vendee. The lessee, like a vendee, was required to inspect the
land for himself and take it as he found it. The general rule
was that there was no tort liability on the part of the landlord
to the lessee or to others entering on the land for injuries resulting from conditions on the premises.,
In the recent decision of Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Insurance
Co. of America,3 the Wisconsin Supreme Court changed the
scope of a landlord's duty toward his tenants (whether under
a lease or not) and their visitors for injuries resulting from
1. See, e.g., Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 62 (1809); Becar v. Flues, 64 N.Y. 518 (1876).
2. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 63 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as Prosser]; 1 H. TiFFANY, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY, § 104 (3d ed. B. Jones
1939). For a thorough discussion of the historical development of the common law

rules of landlord-tenant relationships, see generally Love, Landlord's Liability for
Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence, or Strict Liability? 1975 Wis. L. REV.
19 [hereinafter cited as Love].
3. 91 Wis. 2d 734, 284 N.W.2d 55 (1979).
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defects in the premises.4 The court held that a landlord must
exercise ordinary care in the maintenance of his premises
under all circumstances and that if a person lawfully on the
premises is injured as a result of the landlord's negligence in
maintaining those premises, the injured person is entitled to
recover from the landlord under the general negligence principles of Wisconsin tort law:5 one is liable for injuries resulting

from conduct foreseeably creating an unreasonable risk to
others.'
I.

THE CASE

In Pagelsdorf, the plaintiff, James Pagelsdorf, was injured
in a fall from his neighbor's upper back porch. The neighbor
was the defendant's tenant under an oral lease. Pagelsdorf
was leaning on a section of a wooden railing while lowering a
box spring from the upper back porch when the railing collapsed and he fell. His damage suit was brought against the
landlord, Richard J. Mahnke, and his insurer, Safeco Insurance Company of America, for failure to exercise ordinary
care in maintenance of the premises. The defendant's defense
was that he had no prior knowledge of the rotting condition in
the railing and that he had no duty to Pagelsdorf other than
to warn him of known hazards.' After the jury found that the
landlord had no knowledge of the railing's defective condition,
the trial court entered judgment for the defendant. Pagelsdorf
appealed.
4. Id. at 744, 284 N.W.2d at 60. The court was careful to limit the landlord's duty
to exercise ordinary care to those persons "lawfully on the premises." See notes 7 and
54 infra and accompanying text. See also note 33 infra and the accompanying text
for a discussion of the impact of implied warranty of habitability.

5. Id. at 745, 284 N.W.2d at 61.
6. Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W. 372 (1931).

7. The facts of the case arose when Wisconsin still determined the duty of an
occupier of land on a sliding scale according to the status of the visitor. To trespass-

ers, the landlord owed only a duty to refrain from willful and intentional injury.
Copeland v. Larson, 46 Wis. 2d 337, 341, 174 N.W.2d 745, 748 (1970). A person who

had permission to enter the land, but who went upon it for his own purposes rather
than to further an interest of the possessor was a licensee to whom the limited duty
of keeping the property safe from traps and avoiding active negligence was owed. Id.
at 341, 174 N.W.2d at 748. The highest duty-that of ordinary care-was owed to the
invitee who entered the land upon business concerning the possessor and at his invitation. Id. at 342, 174 N.W.2d at 748.
8. Id. at 342, 174 N.W.2d at 748.

19811

PROPERTY

On appeal, the parties argued that the extent of the defendant-landlord's liability to Pagelsdorf was dependent on
whether he was found to have been an invitee or licensee. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, pointed out that the arguments on the status of the visitor were not applicable because the parties' arguments overlooked the effect on a landlord's duty under common law when the landlord has
transferred the premises under a lease to a tenant." When
property is leased, as it was in this case, the duty of the landlord under common law is controlled by a different rule: a
landlord is not liable for injuries to his tenants and their visitors resulting from defects in the premises unless the facts of
the case constitute one of the exceptions to the rule of landlord tort immunity.10 The court found that none of the exceptions to the general rule were applicable to the facts of this
case. Therefore, if the court were to follow the traditional
rule, Pagelsdorf would not be entitled to the instruction that
the landlord, Mahnke, owed him a duty of ordinary care. But
the court held instead "that the better public policy lies in the
abandonment of the general rule of nonliability and the adoption of a rule that a landlord is under a duty to exercise ordinary care in the maintenance of the premises.""
II.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYsIs

Under the common law of the state of Wisconsin, a lease
was viewed as a conveyance of an estate in land. 2 The tenant
as holder of the estate was entitled to exclusive use and possession of the land. Inherent in this right was the landlord's
lack of any right of re-entry. Therefore, the landlord was
9. 91 Wis. 2d at 740, 284 N.W.2d at 58.
10. The exceptions to the doctrine of tort immunity subjecting the landlord to
liability were: (1) there were undisclosed or hidden dangers known only to the landlord; (2) the land was leased for public use; (3)the particular area was a common area
of which the landlord maintained control; (4) the landlord has made the land dangerous through negligently made repairs. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, §
27 (3d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as Harper & James] and RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 356-62 (1965).
11. 91 Wis. 2d at 741, 284 N.W.2d at 59.
12. See generally Quinn and Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant:A Critical
Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225
(1969). See also, Harper & James, supra note 10, at 1506; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 356, Comment a (1965).
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under no obligation to look after the leased premises. The
landlord was entitled to rent; but, absent an agreement to the
contrary, a landlord was under no obligation to repair." As
the concept of tort liability developed, the courts formulated a
general rule exempting landlords from liability for injuries
caused by defective or dangerous conditions on the leased
premises. Certainly a landlord who had no power to enter and
repair had no liability for injuries resulting from the unmade
repairs. This was the responsibility of the tenant who had
taken possession under the terms of the lease. 14 This general
common law rule on nonliability of a lessor of land to others
for injuries occurring after the lessee had taken possession was
based on the concept of the lease as a conveyance of property
with the lessee becoming the owner and occupier of the
premises.15
The concept of landlord immunity from tort liability received authoritative support from the doctrine of caveat
emptor. The application of this "sale of goods" concept to
leases purported to put the tenant on notice that he took possession at his own risk.16 The landlord was under no duty to
deliver the premises in a safe condition because it was the responsibility of the tenant to determine for himself the condition of the property before entering into the lease agreement.17 However, as the agrarian leaseholders of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries were replaced by the urban tenant,
the doctrine of caveat emptor became less appropriate.18 The
urban tenant in an industrial economy was no longer inter13. Prosser, supra note 2, § 63 at 400 (4th ed. 1971); See Note, Lessor's Duty to
Repair: Tort Liability to Persons Injured on the Premises, 62 HARv. L. REV. 669
(1949), for a general discussion of the historical development of landlord-tenant tort
law. See Awad v. McColgan, 357 Mich. 386, 390, 98 N.W.2d 571, 573 (1959), where
the court stated: "A tenant may rent tumble-down property if he wishes and if it does
in fact tumble down during his occupancy, the landlord without more, is not liable."
14. Comment, The Fall of Landlord Tort Immunity, 35 OHIo ST. L.J. 212, 215
(1974).
15. Skrzypczak v. Konieczka, 224 Wis. 455, 272 N.W. 659 (1937).
16. See also Harper & James, supra note 10, at 1510. Harper and James do not
use the term caveat emptor, but instead talk of the tenant's assumption of risk. This
assumption of risk that the premises are safe is the basic premise of caveat emptor.
See Love, supra note 2, at 27-31.
17. See generally Note, Lessor's Duty to Repair: Tort Liability to Persons Injured on the Premises, 62 HARv. L. REv. 669 (1949).
18. See Love, supra note 2, at 28.
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ested in working the land as a source of income to pay the
rent. He was, instead, interested in adequate living conditions
in which to house his family. 19 As buildings became more
complicated and expensive to repair and as the tenant population became more mobile, many tenants found themselves occupying dwellings which they had neither the expertise nor
the funds to repair.2 0 The courts gradually recognized that the
common law doctrine did not reflect the needs of the urban
tenant. Responsibility for repairs and liability for personal injuries and property damages should be shifted to the landlord.
However, instead of adopting a fundamentally different theory of lessor liability, the court created a number of exceptions to the rule of caveat emptor.2 1 The landlord was held
liable in damages for injuries caused by undisclosed latent defects, 22 negligently made repairs, 23 breach of covenant to repair,24 defects in premises leased to the public,2 5 or defects in
"common areas" under the landlord's control.2 6 The result

was potential lessor liability under certain circumstances but
no fundamental alteration of the application of caveat emptor
to landlord-tenant relationships.
Outside the law of torts, however, there has been an erosion of this general applicability. Acknowledging the modernday apartment lease as a contract and not a conveyance, the

19. Quinn and Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A CriticalEvaluation of
the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAm L. Rv. 225, 231 (1969).
20. Id. "The new type of tenant was anything but self-sufficient and the last thing
he wanted was to be left alone. Since he occupied only a part of the building, he was
dependent on the rest of it. He relied upon the building's water system, lighting system, and heating system; he was sharing walls, doors, corridors and stairways. Agrarian self-reliance in this context is simply not possible."
21. Grimes, Caveat Lessee, 2 VAL. L. Rav. 189, 209-26 (1968); Note, Lessor's
Duty to Repair: Tort Liability to PersonsInjured on the Premises, 62 HRv. L. REv.
669, 671 (1949). See also Cole v. McKay, 66 Wis. 500, 505-06, 29 N.W. 279, 280
(1886).
22. E.g., Flood v. Pabst Brewing Co., 158 Wis. 626, 149 N.W. 489 (1914); Kurtz v.
Pauly, 158 Wis. 534, 149 N.W. 143 (1914).
23. E.g., Gill Building Co. v. Central Garage Co., 258 Wis. 76, 44 N.W.2d 905
(1950); Forkenbridge v. Excelsior Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 240 Wis. 82, 2 N.W.2d
702 (1942); Skrzypczak v. Konieczka, 224 Wis. 455, 272 N.W. 659 (1937).
24. E.g., Flood v. Pabst Brewing Co., 158 Wis. 626, 149 N.W. 489 (1914).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 359 (1965).
26. E.g., Masek v. Bubenheimer, 229 Wis. 194, 281 N.W. 924 (1938); Inglehardt v.
Mueller, 156 Wis. 609, 146 N.W. 808 (1914). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRTs §§ 358-62 (1965).
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27
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Pines v. Perssion
became the

first court to judicially recognize an implied warranty of habitability in an apparent lease.28 In Pines, the court determined
that the general common law principle-that the lessee takes
the premises as he finds them-was in opposition to social
policy judgments inherent in various state legislation and administrative rules. "Legislation and administrative rules, such
as the safe-place statute, building codes, and health regulations, all impose certain duties on a property owner with respect to the condition of his premises." 2 9 This judicial recognition of the lease as primarily a contractual agreement for the
purchase of shelter for a specified period of time provides the
tenant with all the protections of the general law of contracts.
Thus, the lessor's contractual liability was no longer protected
by the doctrine of caveat emptor.30 This gave the tenant, upon
a breach by the landlord, a contract action with contract remedies for breach of implied warranty, including rescission,
damages and rent abatement. 1 However, the implied warranty of habitability encompassing an implied warranty to
make the necessary repairs is totally inconsistent with the
idea that the landlord is immune from tort liability for injuries resulting from a failure to make repairs. On the contrary,
a warranty to repair creates a legal duty to repair, and a
breach of this duty should serve as the basis for tort liability,
not merely as a contractual remedy for personal injuries.
It was at this stage in the development of landlord-tenant
law that the Pagelsdorf court succinctly addressed the question left unanswered by common law development: What tort
remedies did the tenant or third persons have against the
27. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
28. Id. at 596, 111 N.W.2d at 413.
29. Id. at 595-96, 111 N.W.2d at 412.
30. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314 and 2-315 (1979) for explanation of implied warranties in
sales of goods.
31. The court characterized the lease as a contract instead of a conveyance with
the tenant's covenant to pay rent and the landlord's covenant to provide a habitable
house as mutually dependent. 14 Wis. 2d at 596, 111 N.W.2d at 413. Citing Pines, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized an implied warranty in a commercial lease that
the premises were fit for their intended purpose when the tenant took possession in
Earl Millikin, Inc. v. Allen, 21 Wis. 2d 497, 124 N.W.2d 651 (1963). Subsequent to
Pines, the Wisconsin legislature enacted legislation allocating responsibility for major
repairs to the landlord, WIs. STAT. § 704-07 (1977). This was in essence a codification
of Wisconsin's implied warranty of habitability.
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landlord for injuries resulting from a defective condition on
the premises? A tenant could withhold rent for the landlord's
failure to repair the premises, yet he could not recover for
personal injuries or property damages sustained as a result of
the landlord's failure to make those same repairs unless one of
the common law exceptions to the general rule of nonliabiity
applied. The court reasoned that the trend away from special
immunities 2 in tort law and the recognition of an implied
warranty of habitability in an apartment lease supported
abolishing the common law rule of nonliabiity. "It would be
anomalous indeed to require a landlord to keep his premises
in good repair as an implied condition of the lease, yet immunize him from liability for injuries resulting from his failure to
do so.""
The court cited as precedent the New Hampshire ruling in
Sargent v. Rosss' in which the plaintiff's four-year-old daughter died as the result of a fall from an outdoor stairway of a
residential building owned by the defendant. At the time of
the accident, the child was a guest of a tenant and the only
apparent causes for the accident were the steepness of the
stairs and the insufficiency of the railing to keep a child from
falling over the side. The plaintiff sued the landlord for negligent construction and maintenance of the stairway. The jury
returned a verdict for the mother, and the defendant-landlord
objected on the grounds that she owed no duty of care to the
deceased child.
The Sargent court realized that an anomalous result would
have arisen from an application of the doctrine of landlord
tort immunity. The tenants argued that it was unreasonable
to impose upon them the duty of repairing a major structural
defect. The landlord, however, denied liability "because the
stairs were not under her control." 35 Both tenant and landlord
thus claimed the other party should be responsible, and the
doctrine of landlord tort immunity supported both arguments.
As a result, the plaintiff faced a dilemma in the form of a rule
which left "neither landlord nor tenant responsible for dan32.
33.
34.
35.

See note 10 supra, and notes 46-51 infra, and accompanying text.
91 Wis. 2d at 744, 284 N.W.2d at 60.
113 N.H. -, 308 A.2d 528 (1973).
Id. at -, 308 A.2d at 532.
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gerous conditions on the premises.""6 Furthermore, the landlord was encouraged to remain idle by the doctrine of landlord
tort immunity since any attempt to repair might serve as evidence of his control, and repairs actually made might only increase his exposure
to liability if such repairs were negligently
7
3

undertaken.

The court acknowledged that it "could strain this test to
the limits and find control in the landlord" or "broaden the
exception to include the negligent construction of improvements to the premises,"3 8 but concluded that "now is the time
for the landlord's limited tort immunity to be relegated to the
history books where it more properly belongs."3 9 The Sargent
court outlined the rule to be followed:
Henceforth, landlords as other persons must exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of
harm ....

A landlord must act as a reasonable person

under all of the circumstances including the likelihood of injury to others, the probable seriousness of such injuries, and
the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk ....

The ques-

tions of control, hidden defects and common or public use,
which formerly had to be established as a prerequisite to
even considering the negligence of the landlord, will now be
relevant only inasmuch as they bear on the basic tort issues
such as foreseeability
and unreasonableness of the particular
40
risk or harm.

Having previously adopted the rule implying a warranty of
habitability, the New Hampshire court has now held that the
landlord's liability in tort for injury caused by the condition of
rented residential property will be evaluated under ordinary
principles of negligence. 41 The essence of the court's decision
36. Id.
37. See generally Comment, Landlord Tort Immunity Abrogated in Favor of Basic Tort Duty of Due Care in All Circumstances, 8 SUFFOLK L. REv. 1305 (1973);
Note, Abrogation of Landlord's Tort Immunity, 1974 DuKE L.J. 175; Note, Abolition
of Basic Premise of Landlord Tort Immunity, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 1161 (1973); Note,
The Fall of Landlord Tort Immunity, 35 OHio ST. L.J. 212 (1974).
38. 113 N.H. at -, 308 A.2d at 532-33.
39. Id.
40. Id. at -, 308 A.2d at 534.
41. See Annot., 40 A.L.R. 3d 646 (1971); Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability: An Incipient Trend in the Law of Landlord-Tenant?40 FORDHAM L. REV. 123
(1971); Comment, Tenant Protection in Iowa-Mease v. Fox and the Implied War-
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is that, in a legal system which seeks to compensate injured
parties for the harm they have suffered, there is no place for a
doctrine which would immunize landlords from liability. All
tortfeasors must shoulder the responsibility for the foreseeable consequences of their actions.
Taking the initiative from the New Hampshire court, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Pagelsdorf held that a landlord
owes his tenant (or anyone on the premises with the tenant's
consent) a duty of ordinary care. 2 In so holding, the court
rejected the doctrines of caveat emptor in the lease contract
and of landlord immunity in tort. The court rejected the issues as framed by the parties and shifted the primary focus of
the inquiry for judge and jury from the traditional questions
44
of status43 of the injured party and the contractual remedies
to a determination of whether the landlord and injured party
had exercised due care under all of the circumstances. "Issues
of notice of the defect, its obviousness, control of the premises, and so forth are all relevant only insofar as they bear on
the ultimate question: Did the landlord exercise ordinary care
in the maintenance of the premises under all of the
'45
circumstances?
The court in Pagelsdorf found that the retention of landlord tort immunity would also be incompatible with the judicial trend toward abrogation of the traditional immunities of
certain groups from tort liability. 46 Earlier Wisconsin decisions had eliminated the tort immunities for family members,47 governmental entities,4 8 charitable entities,4 spouses 0
and religious institutions. 1 In addition, it would be consistent
with those products liability decisions imposing a duty of rea-

ranty of Habitability,58 IowA L. REv. 656 (1973).
42. 91 Wis. 2d at 745, 284 N.W.2d at 61.

43. See note 7 supra, and note 54 infra, and accompanying text.
44. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
45. 91 Wis. 2d at 745, 284 N.W.2d at 61.
46. Id. at 743, 284 N.W.2d at 60.

47. Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
48. Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
49. Kojis v. Doctors Hosp., 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W.2d 131, 107 N.W.2d 292
(1961).
50. Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 210 N.W. 822 (1926).
51. Widell v. Holy Trinity Catholic Church, 19 Wis. 2d 648, 121 N.W.2d 249
(1963).
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sonable care on manufacturers, distributors of new products,
vendors of used products, repairers and lessors of2 personal
property, and building contractors of real property.
General landlord immunity frustrated the sound principle
that due care should be the standard of conduct if it can reasonably result in a reduction of injury to another person.
Pagelsdorf abrogated a rule riddled with exceptions and
archaic fictions and relegated it to the history books.
III.

CONCLUSION

In repudiating the doctrine of the landlord tort immunity,
the Pagelsdorf court adopted a new standard with which to
judge the conduct of a landlord: the standard of care required
by the general law of negligence. The Pagelsdorfholding addresses many of the problems inherent in the conventional
immunity doctrine. First, the new rule eliminates the common
law basis for immunity disclaimers by the landlord for dangerous conditions on the leased premises. Second, landlords are
no longer deterred from making repairs that under prior law
would have been seen as incidents of continuing control imposing liability if injury had occurred. Third, the new standard of care imposed is compatible with general negligence
principles in Wisconsin and with current trends in tort law
contributing to judicial consistency in the determination of
landlord tort liability. Fourth, the imposition of tort liability
should produce an improvement in the safety conditions of
leased premises supporting the intent of legislative enactment
relegating responsibility to the landlords for liability resulting
from foreseeable danger or defects on leased premises.
However, the Pagelsdorf decision does leave some issues
unsettled. First, it does not purport to impose liability upon
the landlord for all injuries incurred on the property. Instead,
the court persists in holding that the owner of land has only a
duty to refrain from willful and intentional injury toward a
trespasser." This persistence by the court that a lesser duty is
52. See Love, supra note 2, at 118.
53. 91 Wis. 2d at 738, 284 N.W.2d at 58. See Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis.
2d 836, 263 N.W.2d 1 (1975). Antoniewicz abolished the distinction between the duty
owed to a licensee and that owed to an invitee. See note 7 supra. But the court in
Antoniewicz felt the distinction was so great between the legal status of the trespasser and that of the licensee-invitee that the merits of total abolition should be
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owed by the landlord to a trespasser injured on the premises
has no logical relationship to the exercise of reasonble care for
the safety of others. The difference in treatment accorded to a
trespasser should have been abolished." Second, the Pagelsdorf decision may well restrict the availability of rental housing. Faced with the prospect of remedying potential hazards
in leased premises, landlords may find that the cost of repairs
and the cost of higher liability insurance will increase rents
beyond the reach of the lessee or so restrict the profit margin
that renting will be an unprofitable endeavor. The tenant may
be entitled to demand that the landlord deliver a suitable
dwelling and accept liability for the foreseeable consequences
of his conduct; the economics of renting will pass these costs
on to the tenant and the landlord will be entitled to demand a
rent reflective of this increased burden.
In sum, the Pagelsdorf decision is a logical progression of
both property and tort law in Wisconsin. The once justifiable
basis in an agrarian society for landlord tort immunity no
longer exists. What was once a simple property conveyance is
now a complex contractual arrangement subject to the accompanying warranties of sales agreements. Whatever the practical impact of the Pagelsdorf decision, it does serve to bring
the tort liability of landlords into line with general tort principles and is another in a growing series of cases in which tort
immunity for a particular class of persons is abolished.
Clearly, the landlord, whether in control of the defective
premises at the time of the injury or not, must be held liable
if his conduct foreseeably created an unreasonble risk to
others.
PATRICIA JONES D'ANGELO

considered by a common law court only in a case involving a trespasser.
54. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2 at 108, _, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97,
104 (1968) summarized this clearly.
A man's life or limb does not become less worthy of protection by the law nor a
loss less worthy of compensation under the law because he has come upon land
of another without permission or with permission but without a business purpose. Reasonable people do not ordinarily vary their conduct depending upon
such matters, and to focus upon the status of the injured party as a trespasser,
licensee, or invitee in order to determine the question whether the landowner
has a duty of care, is contrary to our modern social mores and humanitarian
values. The common law rules obscure rather than illuminate the proper considerations which should govern determination of the question of duty.
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